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Business Associations
By Joseph Epps Claxton*

This survey article deals with recent Georgia cases and statutes in the
areas of partnerships, corporations, securities regulation, and utilities.
I.

A.

PARTNERSHIPS

Legal Liability of Partners

There are, of course, innumerable issues within the general topic of the
liability of individual members of a partnership. One of the most basic of
these issues concerns whether a new partner is liable for the previously
existing obligations of the partnership. The Uniform Partnership Act does
extend liability for such debts to new partners.
A person admitted as a partner into an existing partnership is liable for
all the obligations of the partnership arising before his admission as
though he had been a partner when such obligations were incurred, except
that this liability shall be satisfied only out of partnership property.'
The basic effect of the UPA provision is to eliminate the confusion that
can arise when a new partner's obligation is fixed by the terms of his
contract of admission-a contract that may be subject to varying constructions.' Georgia, however, has not followed this approach. In two early Georgia Supreme Court decisions, Bracken & Ellsworth v. Dillon & Sons3 and
Morris v. Marqueze & Varney,' it was held that a new partner is not liable
for the old debts of the partnership in the absence of an express agreement,
upon sufficient consideration, to accept those liabilities. The holdings in
these two cases have been codified in a statute,5 which was followed by the
Georgia Court of Appeals during the current survey period in the case of
* Associate professor of Law, Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University. Emory
University (A.B., 1968); Duke University (J.D., 1972). Member of the Georgia Bar.
1. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP AcT §17 [hereinafter cited as UPA]. The limitation to partnership property sometimes is forgotten. It should not be.
2. See 2 Z. CAVITCH, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS §24.05 (1976).
3. 64 Ga. 243 (1879).
4. 74 Ga. 86 (1885).
5. GA. CODE ANN. §75-205 (1973) states: "An incoming partner is not bound for the old
debts of the firm in the absence of an express agreement, on sufficient consideration, to
assume the old indebtedness."
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Cook v. Preskitt.' Reversing the trial court's decision, the court of appeals
reemphasized the necessity of an express agreement to hold an incoming
partner liable for prior partnership obligations.
Another interesting liability issue is raised when a partner is sued individually by a plaintiff injured by the partner's sole negligence when the
negligent act occurred in the course of the partnership business. It is a
basic legal principle that a partnership in general may be liable for such
an act to the same extent as the partner directly involved. 7 That is certainly the rule in Georgia.' A plaintiff, however, has the option of proceeding against the partner alone without regard to the partnership. It was
exactly these facts that led to the decision in Flynn v. Reaves,9 in which
the court of appeals held that the individual partner involved in such a
situation cannot seek contribution from his copartners. This quite predictable result was explained by the court as follows:
Here, the co-partners and defendant are not joint tortfeasors among
themselves. For the co-partners are subjected to liability only by the doctrine of respondeat superior. Thus, defendant whose negligence, if any,
was actual, cannot seek contribution from his co-partners, who are merely
constructively negligent. Of course, had defendant alleged that his copartners were actual tortfeasors, a third-party action for contribution
would lie. But such is not the case.' 0
B.

Procedure

As so often happens, the Georgia Long-Arm Statute" was involved in a
business setting in North Peachtree 1-285 Properties, Ltd. v. Hicks.'2 A
nonresident partner signed a promissory note in partial payment for property being purchased by his partnership as well as a personal guarantee of
payment. The signings took place in the Atlanta offices of the partnership's
6. 137 Ga. App. 250, 223 S.E.2d 282 (1976).
7. UPA §13.
8. There has been considerable confusion on this point, for the very simple reason that
there is a provision in the Georgia Code which states that "[p]artners shall not be responsible for torts committed by a copartner." GA. CODE ANN. §75-308 (1973). There are some
early cases that give a literal interpretation to this rather unfortunate language. See, e.g.,
Corbett v. Connor, 11 Ga. App. 385, 75 S.E. 492 (1912). However, Rogers v. Carmichael, 184
Ga. 496, 192 S.E.39 (1937), held in effect that the statute does not really mean what it says
and that Georgia adheres to the common-law rule of general liability for "a negligent tort
committed by one of the partners within the scope of the partnershipbusiness." Id., 192 S.E.
at 40 (emphasis added). The reader will have to evaluate for himself the validity of this result.
9. 135 Ga. App. 651, 218 S.E.2d 661 (1975).
10. Id. at 654, 218 S.E.2d at 663. The court did say that "had the co-partners been
subjected to liability by the doctrine of respondeat superior, they would have a right of
indemnity against defendant for his actual negligence." Id., n. 2.
11. GA. CODE ANN. §24-113.1 (1971). The relevant portion of the statute provides for
jurisdiction over any nonresident who "[tiransacts any business with this State ....
12. 136 Ga. App. 426, 221 S.E.2d 607 (1975).

BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS

19761

attorneys. The court of appeals held that the defendant partner's actions
were sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over him in the Georgia
courts. The signings amounted to the transaction of business within the
meaning of the Long-Arm Statute. In addition, reference was made to the
well-known case of Coe & Payne Co. v. Wood-Mosaic Corp.,'" in which the
Georgia Supreme Court said the state had an interest in providing judicial
redress against persons who "incur obligations to . . . those within the
ambit of the State's legitimate protective policy."'" The decision in North
Peachtree is consistent with the so-called Illinois Rule, now followed in
Georgia, which is "based on the premise that the Long-Arm Statute contemplates that jurisdiction shall be exercised over non-resident parties to
the maximum extent permitted by procedural due process.""
C.

Termination of a PartnershipInterest

Particularly in the case of a partnership based on professional skills,
such as the providing of medical services, it is not uncommon for the
partnership agreement to provide that in the event a partner becomes
permanently disabled his interest in the partnership will terminate. Unless
the partner formally concedes his own disability, it is necessary for a determination to be made by an independent medical examination. The allocation of considerable sums of money sometimes may hinge on whether such
a determination is made in a proper and timely fashion.
In First National Bank of Atlanta v. Rayle," there was no real doubt of
the affected partner's disability. Nevertheless, the partner never conceded
his disability, and it was an "uncontroverted fact that there had been no
determination of such permanent disability pursuant to the partnership
agreement prior to his death."' 7 Therefore, the court of appeals held, the
affected partner's estate was entitled to the same substantial benefits
(such as insurance payments and a distribution from capital) that would
have been available to the partner if he had been completely active just
prior to his death.
Obviously, a great deal of flexibility is available in the drafting of partnership agreements. It is therefore doubly unfortunate when a simple, clear
element of an agreement is ignored by the parties to it, thus compelling
what would otherwise be unnecessary judicial intervention.
13. 230 Ga. 58, 195 S.E.2d 399 (1973). For an analysis of this case, see Claxton, Annual
Survey of Georgia Law: Agency and Business Associations, 25 MER. L. REV. 21, 42 (1974).
14. 230 Ga. at 61, 195 S.E.2d at 401, quoting Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill.2d 378, 143 N.E.2d
673, 676 (1957).
15. 230 Ga. at 60, 195 S.E.2d at 401.
16. 137 Ga. App. 103, 222 S.E.2d 891 (1975).
17. Id. at 106, 222 S.E.2d at 893 (emphasis added).
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CORPORATIONS

With one exception, a case involving a procedural question,", the decisions dealing with corporate questions during the current survey period
were relatively routine. However, a number of cases did raise points of
some interest.
A.

The Corporation as a Legal Entity

The most fundamental characteristic of a corporation is that "the law
has seen fit to clothe this institution with legal personality."' 9 A corporation, in other words, is a legal entity. There are a multitude of cases in
which this concept is applied, and two new Georgia opinions were added
to the list during the current survey period.
Both of the cases dealt with the so-called alter-ego doctrine, under which
the corporate entity may be ignored and liability for monetary obligations
imposed directly on its shareholders. Probably the most familiar analysis
of the alter-ego doctrine is that set forth by the California courts. In general
terms, the application of the doctrine requires the satisfaction of two
conditions: "(1) [T]hat there be such unity of interest and ownership that
the separate personalities of the corporation and the individual no longer
exist and (2) that, if the acts are treated as those of the corporation alone,
an inequitable result will follow." 2
In Trans-American Communications, Inc. v. Nolle2' a former corporate
officer sought to pierce the corporate veil to recover unpaid salary from a
holding company which was the sole shareholder of the employer corporation. The former officer successfully relied upon the alter-ego doctrine,
primarily because of evidence that the holding company had used and
drained the resources of the employer-subsidiary in order to improve the
position of other subsidiaries. The facts of the case include a number of
classic indications of intermingling between the two theoretically separate
businesses: They were both located in the same building, .the corporate
officers overlapped, there was a central bookkeeping office, employees were
interchanged between the companies, and, according to direct testimony,
income was pooled. It was apparent that the subsidiary "was in fact the
mere agent, instrumentality, and alter ego" of the holding company.22
23
Reference to the alter-ego doctrine was also made in Goldgar v. Jetter,
18. See Process Systems, Inc. v. Dixie Packaging Co., 137 Ga. App. 452, 222 S.E.2d 891
(1976), discussed in notes 42-45, infra, and accompanying text.
19. N. LArrIN, THE LAW OF CORPORAbONs 65 (2d ed. 1971).
20. Automotriz Del Golfo De California v. Resnick, 47 Cal.2d 792, 796, 306 P.2d 1, 3
(1957). The reader may also wish to examine Minton v. Caveney, 56 Cal.2d 576, 364 P.2d
473 (1961).
21. 134 Ga. App. 457, 214 S.E.2d 717 (1975).
22. Id. at 457-58, 214 S.E.2d at 718, summarizing the employee's argument.
23. 135 Ga. App. 589, 218 S.E.2d 452 (1975).
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which provides an example of how the doctrine is applied sometimes when
simple agency principles could be more suitably relied upon. The issue in
Goldgar was whether an officer-agent who receives money on behalf of a
corporation may be responsible for that sum to the party from whom it is
received, even when the agent did not personally pocket the money and
received no benefit from it. In a concurring opinion, one member of the
court of appeals panel noted that the officer was liable to the party who
had conveyed the money if he knew that the latter was ultimately entitled
to get it back. 4 This view was based on the language of a Georgia Supreme
Court case, Alexander v. Coyne, 5 and does not depend in any way upon
the alter-ego doctrine. Yet the majority opinion insisted on basing its holding against the officer on the proposition that he was the "alter ego" of the
recipient corporation, an approach which need never have been adopted
at all. Moreover, the proposition was apparently based solely on the fact
that the officer in question also owned eighty percent of the corporation's
stock. That fact in itself is certainly not enough to trigger the application
of the alter-ego doctrine. The majority probably reached the correct result,
but it certainly did so in a questionable manner."6
B.

The Doctrine of Ultra Vires

As the term is traditionally used, "[an act or contract of a corporation
is 'ultra vires' where it is beyond the powers expressly or impliedly conferred upon the corporation."" In Georgia as in most other states, the
doctrine of ultra vires has been almost entirely eliminated." Under the
Georgia Corporations Code, it can certainly no longer be raised as a defense
to an action against a corporation on a corporate obligation.2 9 Nevertheless,
24. Id. at 591, 218 S.E.2d at 453.
25. 143 Ga. 696, 85 S.E. 831 (1915).
26. It is quite common for the alter-ego doctrine to be confused with agency concepts, and
frequently no great harm is done as a result. One need look no further than the TransAmerican case, discussed in notes 21 and 22, supra, and accompanying test, to find an opinion
in which the blurring of the distinction is not really critical. The quality of the Goldgar
decision, on the other hand, is seriously undermined by the court's lack of precision in
applying two related but nevertheless different theories.
27. J. KAPLAN, KAPLAN'S NADLER GEORGIA CORPORATION LAW §§7-24 (1971).
28. See GA. CODE ANN. §22-203 (1970).
29. Under the Code, there are three situations in which a plaintiff may use the doctrine
of ultra vires as the basis for an action. They are:
a. In an action by a shareholder or director against the corporation to enjoin the
doing of any act or the transfer of real or personal property by or to the corporation. . ..
b. In action by the corporation . . .against an incumbent or former officer or
director of the corporation, for loss or damage due to his unauthorized act.
c. In an action by the Attorney General . . .to dissolve the corporation, or in
an action by the Attorney General to enjoin the corporation from the transaction
of unauthorized business.
GA. CODE ANN. § 22-203 (1970).
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the effort to do exactly that continues to be made, as illustrated by the
truly hilarious case of Free for all Missionary Baptist Church, Inc. v.
Southeastern Beverage & Ice Equipment, Inc.30 The case arose when the
pastors of the church, operating in their capacities as the president and the
secretary of the church corporation, leased liquor dispensary equipment
from Southeastern Beverage for use in a proposed church-affiliated nightclub. The church actually made a substantial initial payment, but then
defaulted on the monthly rental payments. When Southeastern brought
suit against the church corporation, the latter employed the doctrine of
ultra vires as a defense. Unhappily for the church, however, Georgia's
statutory limitations on the use of the doctrine of ultra vires are applicable
to church corporations . 3 Therefore, certain Biblical admonitions notwithstanding, the defense of ultra vires was unsuccessful.
C.

The Liability of Corporate Promoters

The potential perils of a promoter who enters into a contract with a third
party in the process of establishing a projected corporation were high2
lighted during the current survey period in the case of Wiggins v. Darrah
In Wiggins the court of appeals held that such a promoter "can not be
treated as an agent of the corporation, for it is not yet in existence; and he
will be personally liable on his contract, unless the other party agreed to
' 33
look to some other person or fund for payment.
It is an unfortunate fact of life that many corporate promoters and their
attorneys simply forget the need for a protective clause in a preincorporation contract. The absence of such a provision means that only a valid
novation after incorporation will save the promoter from liability.3 4 Too
often the promoter tends to think of himself as acting on behalf of the
prospective corporation when in fact, as a matter of law, he is acting for
himself.
D.

The Liability of Corporate Officers

When a corporate officer or shareholder misappropriates corporate assets, there is authority under Georgia law for the proposition that a court
operating in equity may decree the individual involved personally liable
for a debt of the corporation that is left unpaid as a result of the misappropriation.3 5 Obviously, however, only a court having equity jurisdiction can
30. 135 Ga. App. 498, 218 S.E.2d 169 (1975).
31. GA. CODE ANN. §22-5501 (1970).
32. 135 Ga. App. 509, 218 S.E.2d 106 (1975).
33. Id. at 511, 218 S.E.2d at 108, quoting Wells v. Fay & Egan Co., 143 Ga. 732, 733, 85
S.E. 873, 874 (1915).
34. See H. I-IENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS §112 (2d ed. 1970).
35. See Tatum v. Leigh, 136 Ga. 791, 72 S.E. 236 (1911), and Lamar v. Allison, 101 Ga.
270, 28 S.E. 686 (1897).
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grant relief upon that theory-a point succinctly noted by the court of
appeals in Scroggins v. Ridge Nassau Corp."6 The trial court which initially
dealt with the case, and granted relief, was the State Court of Cobb
County. Under the Georgia Constitution, superior courts have exclusive
jurisdiction in equity cases."
E.

Rights of Dissenting Shareholders

In Aaron Rents, Inc. v. Corr,31 decided during the 1974 survey period, the
court of appeals considered the nature of a dissenting shareholder's statutory right" to demand that the corporation purchase his shares for their
fair value.4 0 Left unanswered in that decision was the question whether the
dissenting shareholder, who had initially declined to accept the amount
tendered to him by the corporation, was entitled to interest on that amount
until the time of a judgment which ultimately ruled the tendered amount
to be the true value of the shareholder's stock. This question was brought
before the court of appeals during the current survey period in Corr v.
Aaron Rents, Inc. ,4 and no one should be particularly surprised that the
answer was in the negative.
F.

Procedure

Probably the most significant recent decision in the corporate sphere was
that in Process Systems, Inc. v. Dixie Packaging Company, Inc.,'" which
has implications that actually extend far beyond the law of corporations.
The principal issue in Process Systems was whether a New Jersey judgment against a Georgia corporation should be given full faith and credit
in, and thus be subject to enforcement by, the Georgia courts. The determining factor was whether New Jersey had applied its long-arm statute to
the corporation in a proper manner.
The Georgia Court of Appeals applied the well-known "minimal contacts" test in analyzing the validity of New Jersey's claim of jurisdiction.3
This test, which has its origins in decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court,1
36. 135 Ga. App. 547, 218 S.E.2d 448 (1975).
37. GA. CONST. art. VI, §4, 1, GA. CODE ANN. §2-3901 (1973).
38. 133 Ga. App. 296, 211 S.E.2d 156 (1974).
39. The statutory right may be found in both the present and the former Georgia Corporations Codes. GA. CODE ANN. §22-1202 (1970); Ga. Laws, 1937-38, p. 214, repealed by Ga. Laws,
1968, p. 565, 683. The Aaron Rents litigation involved the rights of dissenting shareholders
as set forth in the old Code. Because of the similarities between the relevant provisions of
the two codes, however, there can be little doubt that the Aaron Rents matter is quite relevant
to the existing law.
40. For a discussion of Aaron Rents, Inc. v. Corr, see Claxton, Annual Survey of Georgia
Law: Business Associations, 27 MER. L. REV. 11, 15 (1975).
41. 136 Ga. App. 643, 222 S.E.2d 150 (1975).
42. 137 Ga. App. 452, 224 S.E.2d 103 (1976).
43. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); McGee v. International Life Ins. Co.,
355 U.S. 220 (1957); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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is based on the view that, to establish jurisdiction over a nonresident, there
must "be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the
privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the
benefits and protections of its laws.""
The New Jersey action arose out of contracts that were to be performed
in New Jersey, and which were subject to a modification agreement entered into in New Jersey. An agent of the Georgia corporation on at least
two occasions had visited the New Jersey offices of the other party to the
contract for business discussions. In Process Systems the court of appeals
held that these facts satisfied the minimal contacts test, thus entitling the
New Jersey judgment to be enforced within Georgia. The court summarized its decision with the statement that "where the foreign corporation
contacted the resident corporation in its home state and the work was done
there, the minimal contacts requirement

. .

.[is] met."4 5

The Process Systems opinion will serve as a major precedent for future
decisions on matters involving enforcement actions on foreign judgments.
The case is a prime example of the kind of analysis that one would always
hope to see in the work product of an appellate court.
In a more mundane matter, the court of appeals in Healey v. Morgan"
once again examined the need of a corporation for a certificate of authority
to transact business. In general, the right of a foreign corporation to transact business in Georgia is conditioned on the procurement of such a certificate from the Georgia secretary of state; 47 a foreign corporation that has
failed to obtain a certificate may not maintain an action in any Georgia
court." Healey dealt with the question whether an assignee of a cause of
action held by an unqualified foreign corporation could properly bring a
suit when that assignee is a natural person. The Georgia Corporations Code
makes it clear that a corporate assignee could not maintain such an action,'9 but it does not directly impose a prohibition upon an assignee who
is a natural person. Nevertheless, the court of appeals found no difficulty
in holding that the assignee in Healey could not proceed with the suit,
since he "can acquire no greater rights than his assignor had, and he takes
it subject to the equities and defenses existing between the assignor and
the debtor at the time of the assignment."0
In considering Healey and similar cases, one should not forget that there
are certain activities that a foreign corporation may undertake within
Georgia that are statutorily excluded from the meaning of "transacting44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
137 Ga. App. at 457, 224 S.E.2d at 107.
135 Ga. App. 915, 219 S.E.2d 628 (1975).
GA. CODE ANN. §22-1401(a) (1970).
GA. CODE ANN. §22-1421(b) (1970).
GA. CODE ANN. §22-1421(b) (1970).
135 Ga. App. 915, 219 S.E.2d at 629.

19761

BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS

business."' One should examine these exclusions carefully when evaluating whether a foreign corporation has conducted activities in Georgia in
violation of the rule requiring qualification."
In Fibertex, Inc. v. Caldwell,53 another case revolving around a basically
procedural issue, the Georgia Supreme Court considered the manner in
which a claimant must respond to a superior court order to claimants to
show cause why the report of the receiver in a corporate receivership should
not be approved. The order in question required that an objecting claimant
come before the judge to whom the receivership matter was assigned.
Instead, the claimant made its objection directly to the receiver, and the
matter was eventually heard by a judge other than the one who actually
was charged with handling the case. The second judge approved the receiver's report, and the claimant appealed. The supreme court held in
effect that the claimant had no basis for an appeal, since it had not complied with the procedure for making an objection set forth in the so-called
bar order of the first judge.
If an attorney advised the claimant to make its objection in the manner
it followed, that attorney may have been guilty of malpractice. The bar
order involved was apparently quite cleat, and at least on the basis of the
information in the reported case there would seem to have been no real
excuse for the mistake that was made in responding to the order.
G.

Nonprofit Corporations

Georgia courts rarely involve themselves in the operation of benevolent
As stated by the supreme
associations, including nonprofit corporations.
54
court in Golden Star of Honor v. Worrell:
The general rule is that if a benevolent association confines itself to the
powers vested in it, and acts in good faith under by-laws adopted by it,
and does not violate the laws of the land or any pecuniary or property right
of the member [sic] of the association, the courts have no authority to
interfere with the society by directing or controlling it as to questions of
internal policy, but will leave the society free to carry out any lawful
purpose in accordance with its rules and regulations.5
There are exceptions to this pattern, however, as pointed out by the
court of appeals in Smooth Ashlar Grand Lodge (Compact) of F. & A.A.
York Masons v. Odom.56 That case arose out of an attempt by members of
51. GA. CODE ANN. §22-1401(b) (1970).
52. A good example of a case dealing with such a statutory exception is Winston Corp. v.
Park Electric Co., 126 Ga. App. 489, 191 S.E.2d 340 (1972), discussed in Claxton, supra note
13, at 41.
53. 236 Ga, 136, 223 S.E.2d 111 (1976).
54. 158 Ga. 309, 123 S.E. 106 (1924).
55. Id.
56. 136 Ga. App. 812, 222 S.E.2d 614 (1975).
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a nonprofit corporation to obtain judicial assistance in exercising their
statutory right to inspect the books and records of the corporation.57 The
officers of the Masonic Lodge had actively obstructed the members'
inspection efforts. The court of appeals held that under these circumstances there was certainly nothing improper in the trial court's refusal to
impose summary judgment against the members. In the words of the
Grand Lodge opinion, "[w]here . . . [judicial] interference is necessary
to enforce rights recognized by the law, the courts of this state have not
refused to intervene in the internal affairs of a benevolent society simply
because that society has its own governing rules.""8
H.

New Legislation

There were no significant substantive changes in the Georgia Corporations Code59 during the current survey period. However, in its 1976 session
the General Assembly did enact many technical modifications dealing
with procedures for incorporation, merger, consolidation, and disolution,
as well as certain changes in the routine duties of the secretary of state
regarding corporations. This new legislation does not alter the basic nature of the Corporations Code, and for that reason will not be discussed in
detail in this article.
III.

SECURITIES REGULATION

The Georgia Securities Act of 1973,1' which became effective on April 1,
1974, expressly includes limited partnership interests in its definition of
the term "security.""2 The Securities Act of 1957,11 which was the predecessor of the present law, did not make specific reference to such interests in
its definition of security; 4 however, in two cases decided during the current
survey period that dealt with controversies arising under the 1957 Act, the
court of appeals held that limited partnership interests were indeed securities. In Fortier v. Ramsey 5 the interests were analogized to investment
contracts, which were included in the old act's definition of a security. The
court stated that where "the limited partners look solely to . . . [a] general partner for the enhancement of their investmeits and the ultimate
success of the ventures," the limited partnership interests were definitely
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

See
136
GA.
Ga.
GA.
GA.
Ga.
Ga.
136

GA. CODE ANN. §22-2612 (1970).
Ga. App. at 815, 222 S.E.2d at 616 (emphasis added).
CODE ANN., tit. 22 (1970).
Laws, 1976, p. 1102.
CODE ANN., tit. 97 (1976).
CODE ANN. §97-102(a)(16).
Laws, 1957, p. 134.
Laws, 1957, p. 136.
Ga. App. 203, 220 S.E.2d 753 (1975).
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securities 8 and thus were subject to state registration requirements and
the mandatory disclosures of information involved therein. The Fortier
decision was followed in Kleiner v. Silver.67
Fortier and Kleiner are clearly correct, and build on the earlier opinion
of the court of appeals in Jaciewicki v. Gordarl Associates, Inc.," which
contained a thorough discussion of all the principal judicial tests for the
determination of what is and is not a security. It is apparent that the court
of appeals has acted with a keen awareness of the average investor's need
for protection.
IV.

UTILITIES

In Allied Chemical Corp. v. Georgia Power Co.,6" a case of major importance, the Georgia Supreme Court held that the Georgia Power rate
structure, which to some degree may seem to favor residential users over
industrial consumers, does not operate in such a manner as to deny equal
protection to the industrial consumers. A careful reading of the Allied
Chemical opinion makes it clear that it was not so much the rate structure
itself that favored residential users but rather the change that had been
made from the previous rate structure. The court said, moreover, that the
most fundamental effect of the change was to equalize a previously existing
disparity between industrial and commercial users, not to favor residential
users. In its overall evaluation of the equal protection question, the court
stated:
[T]he evidence . . . was adequate to show that the higher price assessed
against the industrial class rested upon a rational basis which was reasonably related to legitimate ends of utility rate making. So long as this is
so, it is no valid ground for complaint under equal protection principles
that greater "fairness" might have been achieved through overhauling the
rate system in a different manner.70
Because of its general economic effect, Allied Chemical probably has as
much, or more, significance for Georgia business associations than any
Georgia appellate decision in recent years. It certainly is representative of
the kind of legal issues raised throughout the United States since the
erstwhile energy crisis.
66.
67.
68.
40, at
69.
70.

Id. at 206, 220 S.E.2d at 755.
137 Ga. App. 560 (1976).
132 Ga. App. 888, 209 S.E.2d 693 (1974). This case is discussed in Claxton, supra note
18.
236 Ga. 548, 224 S.E.2d 396 (1976).
Id. at 555, 224 S.E.2d at 401.

